Bourdieu and Social Capital: Methodological Challenges

[Updates
16/1/2022: In the title, I replaced 'disciplinary' with 'methodological' as there might be a misreading of the former's meaning;
17/1/2022: confirmed Frisinghelli and Schulteis as curators]

There have for several years been frequent media reports about the various harms caused by large social media enterprises, particularly Facebook.  In spite of the alarm having been raised, occasionally by senior figures such as Sean Parker who warned of its effects on the brain, the businesses have kept on rolling and continue to do so in the face of horrifying testimony divulged by content moderators.  In response, Facebook typically claims that the millions they have invested in research into the impact of well-being demonstrates a generally positive impact.  Even if they were to pour billions more into their research, they would arguably reach the same conclusion.  Why?  Not because of a deliberate policy to evade, but because their research into well-being is based on ‘social capital’, a vaguely defined concept with flaky interpretations. 

I had started drafting a section on this for my Jubilee Centre paper on virtues in the digital world.  I wanted to highlight the considerable influence of this term, though the paper is mainly concerned with cognitive interventions to protect one’s awareness.  I eventually omitted discussion of social capital because the paper was getting lengthy; I felt the need to include quite a bit of preparatory material to an audience unfamiliar with the Buddhist approach I was adopting.

Investigating the Origins of a Notion

So I introduce my thinking on social capital here, initially recapitulating the concern around academic notions, which I first expressed in a paper on sustainable social networking architectures I gave in 2010 (see bottom of first page), and then, in revised form, in Buddhism and Computing (chapter 5), which I largely quote here.

When delving into this, the first problem I came across was the lack of a standard definition, though a certain underlying pattern may be discerned in how systems have been built so far and it carries great significance.  I am particularly grateful to Professor Alejandro Portes, former President of the American Sociological Association, for providing a very useful (and intelligible to me, a non-sociologist) historical overview in Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology.  Portes observed that its sense has broadened from pertaining fundamentally to the individual and their family kinships – rooted in the foundational work of nineteenth century sociologists, particularly Émile Durkheim – to larger-scale social integration.  He credits its first systematic treatment to Pierre Bourdieu, who defined it (for an individual) as 

the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group…

(The Forms of Capital, page 21, or page 247 in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Richardson JG, editor).)

Portes illustrates how the research, whilst aspiring to social cohesion, has in fact given rise to many theories that appear equally to allow both positive and negative networks.  The latter include “exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms” (page 15).   With definitions being vague or ambiguous, he observes that the personal concept of ‘social capital’ based on kinship relationships has gradually evolved to become more impersonal and more generalised.

Indeed, Bourdieu’s definition could be satisfied by many kinds of entities, including federated Internet-based software services, i.e., the systems in which the social capital is being established online. Whilst these services are like the close-fitting manifestations or shadows of human activity, they should not be equated with human relationships themselves – if you get to know someone by email, it is evidenced by a record of correspondence; but if you then meet in person, you do not need that record or email itself to continue developing the friendship.

The system logs are heavily identified with human activity, and with the interpersonal relationships themselves.  Whilst this readily enables quantification and basic usage figures as garnered for analytics, much of the analysis needs careful interpretation and further in-depth enquiry, for which self-responses to a shopping list of questions are surely inadequate.  It is thus unsurprising that the findings with regard to well-being are very mixed, even in the interpretation of identical data, giving the tech companies a great deal of wiggle room to convince (delude?) themselves that their systems really are conducive to well-being.

How then can we reach definite and meaningful conclusions about what is really of value?  Let’s return to Bourdieu’s work.  The quote above is actually a translation from the French: 

Le capital social est l’ensemble des ressources actuelles ou potentielles qui sont liées à la possession d’un réseau durable de relations plus ou moins institutionnalisées d’interconnaissance et d’inter-reconnaissance, ou, en d’autres termes, à l’appartenance à un groupe …

The original was published six years earlier as Le capital social: notes provisoires (Social Capital: Provisional Notes), which appeared in Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales. 1980 Jan;31(1):2–3. 

In strictly linguistic terms, the translation may be straightforward.  However, the context of the definition is important, especially so with Bourdieu, because the interdisciplinary nature of his work is rooted in ethnography.  

 

Images d’Algérie: An Exhibition of Ethnographic Photography

Bourdieu, born in 1930, was conscripted to the French army in 1955 and deployed to Algeria later that year, during the country’s growing struggles for independence from French colonial rule.   He became increasingly disillusioned by the incongruity of the imposed European culture and sympathetic to the cause of self-determination.  After being reassigned to a clerical role and meeting local scholars, he remained in the country during most of the war, affording himself a rare opportunity to understand the local society in situ.  It was during this period, spurred on by a desire to constructively channel his feelings of resentment, that he undertook ethnographic work, particularly of the Kabyle people of Berber ethnicity, using photography as a tool.  

This was a formational period for Bourdieu, very influential, according Goodman and Silverstein, in terms of his cultivation of the relationship between theory and ethnography.   I think this is very evident in a retrospective exhibition of about 150 ‘reunited’ photographs of his fieldwork, ‘PIERRE BOURDIEU: Images d’Algérie’ – une affinité élective’ (PIERRE BOURDIEU: Images of Algeria – Elective Affinities), hosted by the Chateau de Tours, 16 June 2012 – 4 November 2013.   It was featured in Jeu de Paume (magazine)

The introduction to the exhibition reads:

“The exhibition "Pierre Bourdieu. Images of Algeria" shows the photographic works of Pierre Bourdieu, taken during his fieldwork between 1958 and 1961, in the period of the war of liberation in Algeria. The exhibition places these photographic documents in the context of Bourdieu's ethnographic and sociological studies of that time. Bourdieu's pioneering field research, which is here supplemented by his own photographs, provides an insight into the development of his sociological tenets. In addition to illuminating the evolution of his work, the photographs are also impressive documents of social history, which — even after five decades — have lost none of their immediacy and relevance.”

 

The exhibition has indeed special relevance because it was proposed by Bourdieu towards the end of his career, reaffirming the importance of the ethnographic work 35-40 years after he had carried it out. Bourdieu asserted, “You have to see the photos to have a better understanding.”  In an enlightening ten-minute documentary, the curators,  Christine Frisinghelli (Camera Austria, Graz) and Franz Schulteis (Fondation Bourdieu / University of Geneva), relate that when people came to see them, they’d keep “coming back to the same photo a dozen times, finding a dozen different things”.

The pictures open up access to a foreign culture and are furthermore linked to texts written by Bourdieu; reading the texts enables a better understanding of the photos, so they are mutually enhancing.  For example, a series of photos featuring a village – the cottages and daily activities of the inhabitants – were really about social gatherings.  In one photo, a group of children are collecting water from a fountain.  This is significant because it was traditionally the role of women to act as water gatherers, but now women couldn’t leave the home anymore; it was considered a matter of honour that “women didn’t wander about unaccompanied in public and didn’t meet with foreigners”.   So, they were disempowered, but this requires knowing the history.  This kind of observation contributed to the empirical basis for the theory of habitus that Bourdieu developed, specifically to internal views in social culture, whereby in the face of external colonisers, the locals applied a certain self-constraint in response.

What I find striking is the sympathetic nature of the processes by which these discoveries came about; for Bourdieu the use of photography was a means to express to people, “I am interested in you and your life, in your circumstances.”  I think this disposition helped him understand, as reported by the curators, that observation and reflection change your outlook on life, allowing you to gain a deeper focus.  In that very inclination, we have already a close linkage between subjective and objective, which, was central to his ideas of habitus.   (Incidentally, I would have liked to have asked Bourdieu why is it that in some cultures people sit cross-legged, but not in others.)

A catalogue accompanied the exhibition, under the same title, Images d'Algérie: Une affinité elective.  An insightful blog post in the Amazon reviews section highlights the interconnectedness and complementarity in the diachronic process of photography and writing.  The work subsequently appeared in English translation, as Picturing Algeria.

 

Power as Capacity

In the light of Bourdieu’s fieldwork, social capital can obviously be seen in terms of empowerment.  In English, ‘power’ is all too readily associated with politics, but – despite his considerable interest in power relations – that wasn’t necessarily the root intention for Bourdieu.  As the narrative accompanying the photography exhibition indicates, he was working somewhat like an archaeologist, identifying and peeling off the incongruent layers of European colonial culture to allow the native culture to breathe again.  

This perspective is confirmed in Notes Provisoires, which he wrote twenty years later, discussing how social capital is developed in a group context.  In explaining the durable aspect of social capital, Bourdieu makes particular use of the word le pouvoir (‘power’):

… grâce à ce capital collectivement possédé, un pouvoir sans rapport avec son apport personnel, chaque agent participe du capital collectif, symbolisé par le nom de la famille ou de la lignée, mais en proportion directe de son apport, c’est-à-dire dans la mesure où ses actions, ses paroles, sa personne font honneur au groupe

 

Google Translate renders this (with my minor corrections) as:

… then thanks to this collectively owned capital, a power unrelated to their personal contribution, each agent participates in the collective capital, symbolized by the name of the family or lineage, but in direct proportion to his contribution, that is to say to the extent that his actions, words, and person honour the group

 

This is very much about agency.  When learning French in secondary school in the 1980s, thanks to one of my teachers, I became more aware that it has this sense of ‘capability’ or ‘capacity’; my contemporaneous Collins Robert English-French/French-English dictionary (a reprint of the 1st edition, 1979) gives as the noun’s first entry:

pouvoir (faculté) (gén) power; (capacité) ability, capacity; (Phys, gén: propriété).  avoir le ~ de faire to have the power ou ability to do; il a le ~ de se faire des amis partout he has the ability to make friends everywhere; il a un extraordinaire ~ d’éloquence/de conviction he has remarkable ou exceptional powers of oratory/persuasion; ce n’est pas en mon ~ it is not within ou in my power; it is beyond my power; il n’est pas en son ~ de vous aider it is beyond ou it does not lie within his powers to help you; il fera tout ce qui est en son ~ he will do everything (that is) in his power ou all that can possibly be done; ~ couvrant/éclairant covering/lighting power; ~ absorbant absorption power, absorption factor.

That entry says quite a lot about one’s capacity to form relationships.  It’s really important (in my view).  Taking le pouvoir as a natural capacity to do things, in a society where even simple daily activities are constrained, the meaning is inevitably coloured, so that one has to struggle to have what should be naturally-given pouvoir.  Hence the ‘power relations’ and the political overtones, especially those of control, which came to preoccupy Bourdieu so deeply and for which he perceived a deficit in sociological theories that he sought to remedy.  Nevertheless, I perceive that Bourdieu maintains the primary sense of pouvoir, as given in Collins-Robert; it should be borne in mind that it relates to human agency, which, I believe, is fundamental to our sense of freedom and ability to grow.  Just as luminosity is primarily defined by the sun and not by clouds, so pouvoir as capacity should precede the sense of power and authority, which are more properly conveyed by another term I learnt as a child, la puissance.

Yet, that meaning seems to have been supplanted by what Collins-Robert gives as the second sense (autorité).  Now, in the Collins dictionary, we have as the primary definition:

(= influence, autorité) power 

Le Premier ministre a beaucoup de pouvoir. The prime minister has a lot of power.

avoir pouvoir de faire (= autorisation) to have the authority to do ⧫ to have authority to do; (= droit) to have the right to do

The meaning seems to have become the equivalent of the English word, ‘power’.  Quite a change!  A result of globalisation, perhaps?

 

Lost in Translation?

As his influence grew, Bourdieu became troubled that his ideas were being widely misinterpreted; their cultural translation to the English-speaking world was proving particularly problematic.  In a lecture delivered in French at the University of California, San Diego, in March of 1986, reproduced in Pierre Bourdieu, Choses dites (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1987, pp. 147-166, and translated from the French by Loic J. D. Wacquant), he opened with (emphasis mine):

I would like, within the limits of a lecture, to try and present the theoretical principles which are at the base of the research whose results are presented in my book Distinction (Bourdieu 1984a), and draw out those of its theoretical implications that are most likely to elude its readers, particularly here in the United States, due to the differences between our respective cultural and scholarly traditions

 

A couple of paragraphs later he determined:

I think that it is particularly necessary to set the record straight here: indeed, the hazards of translation are such that, for instance, my book Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) is well known, which will lead certain commentators…

 

As a disciplinary outsider, it’s not practical for me to work through his large output, in the original or in translation, which is why the exhibition catalogue is so valuable.   Another entry point is Choses dites, one of the main compendia of Bourdieu’s work, in which he tries to reassess and clarify.  Not having it to hand, I’ve consulted an extended review by Dick McCleary, whose own life appears well-travelled.

But I have to admit I don’t feel much wiser.  That may be due to my denseness or the lack of clarity on the part of the reviewer, but I suspect that it’s more the verbal expressions, where definitions are imprecise and wrapped up in very involved discourse (a different world from my background of mathematics).  For example, having watched and listened to the ethnographic photography exhibition, I feel I have a tentative understanding of habitus, at least in a very simple form, but when I turn to McCleary’s account, in which he quotes verbatim from (Bourdieu, Outline of A Theory of Practice, p. 124), it’s another matter. 

In the more general sense it has in the 'symbolic economy' which has been Bourdieu's chief concern, capital consists in the power to control and use the means and social mechanisms required for cultural production to shape perception and understanding in accordance with the shapers' views and interests. The differential distribution of all forms of capital among agents and groups of agents determines their position in the social space of dominant and dominated classes. Their position in turn determines their habitus – the 'system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures [which constitutes] the socially informed body, with its tastes and distastes, its compulsions and repulsions … '

 

I find the basic notion of capital straightforward enough, but the subsequent expression rambling and nebulous.  Such material is evidently difficult to elucidate, but I feel there’s too much wrapped up together.  It needs unpacking, a proper separation of concerns.

Returning to our original focus of social networking sites, this lack of clarity and succinctness very likely underlies problems with the definition of [social] capital and its current application to the online context.  However, the content also provides important guidance that should inform solutions.  In The Forms of Capital, Bourdieu adds a footnote to the definition of social capital (emphasis own).

Here too the notion of cultural capital did not spring from pure theoretical work, still less from an analogical extension of economic concepts. It arose from the need to identify the principle of social effects which, although they can be seen clearly at the level of singular agents—where statistical inquiry inevitably operates—cannot be reduced to the set of properties individually possessed by a given agent.

I would reinforce what Bourdieu is intimating and assert that the notions he puts forward can barely be understood without attending to the practical context over an extended period; the visuals informed his analysis deeply after due reflection.  It confirms for me that it is unrealistic to think that one can gain more than a shallow insight into social capital generated by people’s online activities through usage analytics and surveys alone.  

We are left then with only the more obvious manifestations, as with the political activities, which have very marked patterns online.  Unfortunately, these are well-known for having fostered ills ranging from addiction to division and hatred (hateful speech), leading to mounting experiences of dissatisfaction, i.e., of negative capital, with perceived powers of corruption and nefarious control.   The promotion of social capital by the big tech companies then seems ironic given that the main driver for Bourdieu’s research was the struggles of the Algerian people against French colonialism – an oppressive regime or system that artificially constrains, diminishing real autonomy and agency.    

With the notions of social capital being so vague and diluted, it is difficult to go beyond the broad-brush macro analyses with its ham-fisted metrics such as page impressions, ‘likes’ and so on.   We are unlikely to build a compassionate society by these means, which is why we need fresh insights and radically new solutions.  We need metta, not Meta …

 

Glimpses of a Buddhist Response

Bourdieu has demonstrated that both the subjective and objective are needed for a proper understanding of habitus.  In that regard, Bourdieu discusses the senses; continuing with McCleary’s quote above,  

the socially informed body, with its tastes and distastes, its compulsions and repulsions, with, in a word, all its senses not only the traditional five senses, but also the sense of necessity and the sense of duty, the sense of direction and the sense of reality, the sense of balance and the sense of beauty, common sense and the sense of the sacred, tactical sense and the sense of responsibility, business sense and the sense of propriety, the sense of humour and the sense of absurdity, moral sense and the sense of practicality, and so on'.

The five physical senses (eye and sights, ear and sounds, tongue and tastes, body and tactile objects, nose and smells) are extended by a list that relate to perceptions, sensitivities and more general views – to properly encompass social capital, one needs deep understanding of the subjective human experience and inclinations, motivating cognitive science, which is central to my recent paper.

From a Buddhist perspective, to the five sense bases and sense organs is added the sixth sense of mind (mano) and mental objects (dhammā), which together comprise the saḷāyatana.  The list may then be approached in terms of conditioned states – the five khandhas (‘heaps’) of form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations and consciousness – and as dependently arisen processes mediated through the senses: with contact through a sense, feeling arises and consciousness of that.  From feelings, arise perceptions, which in turn condition and are conditioned by mental formations.  These mental formations constitute the habitus, but our interest is not so much in the detail of these formations, but rather in the ethical quality of associated actions in body, speech in mind – for these are the determinants of wellbeing.  Are they pure or impure? 

“What is good, what is bad? What is right, what wrong? What ought I to do or not to do? What, when I have done it, will be for a long time my sorrow ... or my happiness?”

(from Lakkhaņa Sutta [DN 30; iii:157] )

A foundation for the moral sense that Bourdieu identified is termed sīla (moral virtue), which is typically grouped in a threefold mode of practice – dāna  (generosity), sīla and samādhi (mental concentration).  So, a Buddhist approach to social capital concerns the cultivation of these three.

Buddhist teachings do take account of the social context, particularly in the understanding of human relationships.  The pouvoir to form relationships is expounded in the Sigalovāda Sutta.  It covers the various kinds of relationships that Bourdieu mentions, but the value is in becoming a more virtuous person.  Accordingly, this forms the basis of my architecture for Sigala SNS.   It is underpinned by agency, for which in Buddhism is characterised as an autonomous person who can exercise six qualities – initiation, effort, exertion, steadfastness, perseverance and endeavouring, as described in the Attakārī Sutta (teachings on the self-doer).

The Buddha also described another kind of capital, spiritual capital – puñña (merit), which deserves its own blog post.  It too can translate into economic gain through karma-vipaka (karmic fruits), but  regarded spiritually, it is able to create conditions to support deliverance from Samsara.

For now, I need to return to the work of another Frenchman, Fabien Potencier, as I try to familiarise myself with Symfony: The Fast Track so as to code a proof of concept for Sigala.

Weber's Sociology of Religion: Asceticism and Mysticism

I've plunged right into the main text and swum towards content focuses on asceticism and mysticism, as these two concepts appears to lie at the heart of Weber's distinguishing analysis of religious communities. The main chapter in my particular edition of the Sociology of Religion (translated by Ephraim Fischoff and part of the series of 'Social Science Paperbacks') is Chapter XI: Asceticism, Mysticism and Salvation Religion. You should be able to find quotes conveniently via the book search in the Google Books rendering of 'Economy and Society' By Max Weber, so I'm dropping most of the page numbers.

Asceticism

Weber makes extensive use of "asceticism" - it's defined with very significant purpose for his works and probably because of this, as he concedes, the meaning doesn't have not the broadest usage.

He grounds many of his definitions in a salvific goal, detailed in chapter X: 'The Different Roads to Salvation,' which I find a reassuring basis for presenting religious practices at deeper levels. Thus, he then defines asceticism (in the penultimate paragraph): “Salvation may be viewed as the distinctive gift of active ethical behavior performed in the awareness that god directs this behavior, i.e., that the actor is an instrument of god. We shall designate this type of attitude toward salvation, which is characterized by a methodical procedure for achieving religious salvation, as "ascetic."” Weber indicates that for someone who leads a life without a keen focus on salvation: "The world is full of temptations ... more because it fosters in the religiously average person complacent self-sufficiency and self-righteousness in the fulfilment of common obligations."

Accordingly, the first words in chapter XI that introduce the general discussion on asceticism and mysticism are framed around the development of the path to salvation: “Concentration from the actual pursuit of salvation may entail a formal withdrawal from the "world"”. Weber contrasts between two constrasting modes or views concerning interaction in the world:

a) weltablehnende Askese ("world-rejecting asceticism"): One whose attitude is that participation in the wordly activities may be regarded as an acceptance of these affairs, "leading to an alienation from God."

b) inner-weltliche Askese ("inner-worldly asceticism"): a path of salvation that requires "participation within the institutions of the world but in opposition to them" according to the individual's own sacred religious dispositions and his qualifications "as the elect instrument of god." (Note that here "inner" qualifies worldly in the general sense of "world" - it's not referring to an individual's personal internal world. )

Wordly Asceticism

So Weber has defined "asceticism" using the world as a reference point and has defined two points of view. In the following pages he gives quite a number of examples, but they all seem related to inner-weltliche Askese, so I find it difficult to ascertain what is meant by weltablehnende Askese. It's meaning only becomes clearer when he contrasts it later with mysticism.

Characteristic of the inner-worldy ascetic type is the reformer/revolutionary: "he may have the obligation to transform the world in accordance with his ascetic ideals." Weber establishes the context in examples, including the 'Parliament of Saints' under Oliver Cromwell, who ruled with a strong puritan conviction (see e.g. Sir Charles Firth, Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England); and the Quaker State of Pennysylvania "and in other types of radically pietistic conventile communism." I'm mot sure what to make of the latter (probably because my knowledge of the relevant history is not extensive).

Weber highlights inequalities: "such a congery of ascetics always tends to become an aristocratic, exclusive organisation within or definitely outside the world of the average people who surround these ascetics." Yet isn't that inappropriate regarding the organisation of the Quakers? Quakers are egalitarian - there is no church hierarchy as such. (see e.g. Facts About Friends by Ted Hoare on the Religious Society of Friends Website); and their meeting houses welcome people from outside for many kinds of activities. Pennsylvania is known for its religious tolerance, following William Penn's 'FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA' (1682) allowing freedom of conscience:

For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil: wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same." "He is the minister of God to thee for good." "Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake."

Weber's interest is directly on the institutions - the collective involvement reflecting religious beliefs and having started with two basic views of asceticism, focuses further on the second option of world involvement; following on from forced religiosity (as may be considered under the Parliament of the Saints) he considers the case of not demanding religious conformance.... and the tension between the world being both a divine creation and full of sinfulness(pp. 167-168) and hence argues for the necessity of careful involvement according to a strict legal code. Hence, it is argued, for Protestantism the importance of loyalty to obligations. Weber claims "it is the sole method of proving religious merit" and it's easy to see that where the legal has something to say about work and financial management, that can lead to the storing of capital...

In summary, Weber writes: "the person who lives as a worldly ascetic is a rationalist, not only in the sense that he rationally systematizes his own personal patterning of life, but also in his rejection of everything that is ethically irrational, esthetic, or dependent upon his own emotional reactions to the world and its institutions."

Mysticism

Mysticism? There may be a problem with this word - as a detractor first quipped long ago: "myst-i-cism begins with mist, puts the I in the centre, and ends in schism." I once read a meditation manual that had a forthright statement as if in protest at its sense of vagueness and impenetrability, saying that this was not a book where one would find mysticism, but rather it was about developing keen insight! Yet, in practice it's a term that reflects the deeper contemplative life that is not immediately accessible to the everyday mind and so the way of a 'msytic' may appear at first glance a complete mystery.

To try and get a handle on Weber's view of mystics I turned to the index and worked forwards from the first entry. Overall, I find it difficult to pin down definitions, because it seems that Weber tries to develop in parallel multiple strands interwoven around a few themes. There's a lot of movement across cultures and traditions, a lot is implicit and perhaps biased to a culture that is no longer so evident, so definitions don't stand out very clearly, but rather seem to emerge gradually along the way, tied to the themes that themselves are emerging.

First reference appears to be on page 119, which is in a chapter entitled 'Intellectuals, Intellectualism and the history of religion.' However, it only describes an influence through the various writings of those with monastic orientation (Buddhist, Islamic and medieval Christianity] - particularly poets, about which Weber remarks: "This circumstance also accounts for the psychological proximity of mystical and spiritual emotion to poetic afflatus, and for the role of the mystic in the poetry of both the Orient and the Occident."

Subsequent references are concerned with involvement of intellectual classes, how intellectuals turned against the papacy, a period during which "Humanists displayed ... an individualistic mysticism, as in Germany during the first period." [I couldn't find a name, but from a quick search online I come across Johann Reuchlin, who was interested in Jewish Mysticism]. Throughout Weber displays considerable knowledge of classical history and literature.

It's really only in the chapter 'The Different Roads to Salvation' that I gain some idea. He builds up to it by a consideration of ritual, noting that "salvation may be the accomplishment of the individual himself without any assistance on the part of supernatural powers, e.g. in ancient Buddhism." (Buddhism certainly has been described as salvation without a saviour). For Weber the purpose of ritual is to bring about a "religious mood" as "an instrument of the divine", whence the rituals themselves become superfluous. Weber describes how the deepening of this practice can lead to pietistic devotion so that it becomes continuous and readily takes on a mystical character, but remarks that it often lapses into pure ritualism. There's a lot of discussion of rituals, religious moods, systematisation with particular attention to educational aspects and how that can lend itself to greater involvement in society (e.g. training in casuistry in Judaism).

Weber then starts to draw out some features "out of the unlimited variety of subjective conditions" where certain methodological procedures of sanctification are of central importance "not only because they represent psycho-physical states of extraordinary quality, but because they also appear to provide a secure and continuous possession of the distinctive religious acquirement. This is the assurance of grace (certitudo salutis, perseverantia gratia)." And these "May be characterised by more mystical or actively ethical coloration" He goes on to list a number of practices to be adopted (over transient sense-based practices): "principally by planned reductions of bodily functioning, such as can be achieved by continuous malnutrition, sexual abstinence, regulation of respiration and the like." (These prompts me to think especially of the group of the world-rejecting lifestyle followed by the 5 ascetics that accompanied the Bodhisattva Gotama until he went off to finally attain nibbana by himself: apart from sexual abstinence, these are not aspects of the Buddhist path, a middle way that would not seek malnutrition or to regulate the breath.)

Then Weber gives some examples of mind training, through concentration methods. He observes that these practices may be further streamlined (p.162):

"Similarly the monastic procedural plan for attaining sanctification developed increasingly in the direction of rationalization, culminating in India in the salvation methodology of ancient Buddhism and in the Occident in the Jesuit monastic order which exerted the greatest historical influence."

Thus a combined physical /psychological regimen with regulation of manners and scope of thought and action. [An interesting link between Buddhist practice and Jesuit practice].

Weber approaches a definition really only towards the end of the chapter by once again using salvation as the anchor: "But the distinctive content of salvation may not be an active quality of conduct, that is, an awareness of having executed the divine will; it may instead be a subjective condition of a distinctive kind, the most notable form of which is mystic illumination."

So the salvific content is without reference to the world. It seems quite fitting in terms of Buddhist goal of nibbana - where the grounding is not in the conditioned, but the unconditioned. Yet, even Englightened beings before they attain to parinibbana have to walk on the Earth, breathe its air etc, i.e. there is conduct w.r.t. to the world and the quality of conduct is important - so for someone on the path, activity tends to good kamma and ideally to kiriya - and to describe this conduct for non-theistic religions or at least those religions where divinity is not central, one might be able to substitute simply: "having acted in a holy way."

And what is the quality of the conduct of these practitioners? "... and among them only as the end product of the systematic execution of a distinctive type of activity, namely contemplation." I initially had difficulty scanning the first few words of this sentence and thus making sense of it, but found a clearer translation by Stephen Kalberg (which can be gleaned from a Google search, so you don't need to actually read the article) : "... only to be achieved as the end product ...". So even mystic illumination is to be achieved and not in a random way, but systematically.

Who can undertake this practice? Weber claims it is restricted to a minority with religious qualifications. Yet the contemplative path is fulfilled today by the practice of meditation according to the Buddha's teachings and that is arguably open very widely. In fact I've been taught that there are only three kinds of peope who can't meditate: dead people, people who are severely mentally deranged and people who just won't try!

What more does Weber say about mysticism? Weber makes clear then need for cessation of mental involvement in worldly concerns: "For the activity of contemplation to succeed in achieving its goal of mystic illumination, the extrusion of all everyday mundane interests is always required." and "According to the experience of the Quakers, God can speak within one's soul only when the creaturely element in man is altogether silent." He asserts further, "In agreement with this notion, if not with these very words, it all contemplative mysticism from Lao Tzu and the Buddha up to Tauler." Yes, I think quietude is universal for the contemplative, though I think it important to emphasize that there's inevitably some conduct in the world and that conduct can (always) be used as part of the holy life, else the impression can be given that the mystical life is exclusively about cultivating jhanic absorptions, say.

Mysticism vs asceticism

So having depicted the mystic contemplative, Weber then draws a distinction with world-rejecting asceticism: “Such a contemplative flight from the world, characteristic of ancient Buddhism and to some degree characteristic of all Asiatic and Near Eastern forms of salvation, sems to resemble the ascetic world view - but it is necessary to make a very clear distinction between the two. In the sense employed here, "world-rejecting asceticism" is primarily oriented to activity within the world.” I'm still not sure about the meaning - but (looking at some articles elsewhere) I think for Weber it means that one moves in the world, particularly earns a living there, without trying to change the world. On the other hand, the mystic contemplative leaves behind such society. (However, it seems more logical to me to say that any interaction in the 'world experiment' is going to have some effects, possibly negligible).

Hence "in contrast to asceticsm, contemplation is the primarily the quest to achieve rest in god and in him alone." Weber adds some fair descriptions of some mental states characteristic of this path: "It entails inactivity, and in its most consistent form it entails cessation of thought, the nemesis of everything that in any way reminds one of the world."

Although the Buddhist path is to minimise distractions, the issue of the rejection of the world needs care, I think. It is most commonly a personal statement of an individual who resolves with great determination to go from being a householder into homeless life - an example, roughly contemporary to Weber is Ven. Sunlun Sayadaw. However, a general application of an 'anti-' tone is questionable, and may not be consistent with the Buddhist practise of the Middle Way and accumulating perfections (paramis), which necessarily has to take place in the world. From a Buddhist perspective, there are many inaccuracies or problems with language in the descriptions: "By these paths the mystic achieves that subjective condition which may be enjoyed as the possession of, or mystical union with, the divine." The nearest to "the divine" would be considered to be Brahma and hence it's more accurately a description of Brahmanism, not Buddhism which teaches this as anatta (not-self).

Generally, Weber writes in a way that seeks to be fair and representative, but "This is a distinctive organisation of the emotions which seems to promise a certain type of knowledge." appears a weak description! What kind of knowledge? Evidently mystical! "...although it becomes more incommunicable the more strongly it is characterized by idiosyncratic content, it is nevertheless recognised as knowledge." Weber uses the term "gnosis" giving rise to a new orientation to the world. [The 'idiosyncratic' is a term relative to the mundane, of course; conversely, using the transcendent as a frame of reference, the worldly life may be considered idiosyncratic too.]

Weber's view of Buddhist formulations: "In Buddhism, no one becomes one of the illuminated by explicitly affirming the obviously highly trivial formulations of the central Buddhist dogma, or even by achieving a penetrating understanding of the central dogma." Highly trivial?! Weber goes on to indicate the requirements of following "procedures for winning salvation.", i.e. Magga (path). Fair enough.

For Weber, "we are not interested here in the details of the general problem [of communication of this knowledge], but only in the negative effect upon behavior which is distinctive of all contemplation." Weber often associates the word "negative" with the contemplative because of their stance of fleeing from the world, it is a is relative perspective w.r.t. to social and economic involvement. Weber carries on piling up a lot of negative language, depicting a sharply divided contrast between 'the ascetic' and 'the contemplative,' a dichotomy with opposing views about the path to salvation and, e.g. "the contemplation of the mystic appears to the ascetic as indolent, religiously sterile, and ascetically reprehensible self-indulgence ...". I wonder, though, if this rather heavy and forced view of negativity might prove erroneous. Surely these differences don't have to have such negative associations - a SammaSamBuddha teaches for the benefit of others, whereas a Pacceka Buddha doesn't teach - yet in the Buddhist view both are worthy of praise as having attained to nibbana and never self-indulgent.

In relation to sustenance, Weber speaks through his perceived ascetic view that "the mystic lives in everlasting inconsistency, since by reason of the very fact that he is alive he must inevitably provide for the maintenance of his own life." And goes on to argue that to be consistent a mystic must maintain his life only by voluntary donation "it accounts for the very strict prohibition (... found among the Buddhists) against receiving anything that has not been given freely." Weber asserts on the next page: "It will be recalled that the central and almost sole lay virtue among the Buddhists was originally the veneration of the monks..." (echoing what he says in Chapter XI: The Social Psychology of World Religions in Max Weber: Essays in Sociology' by By Max Weber, H. H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills: "Buddhism was propagated by strictly contemplative, mendicant monks, who rejected the world and, having no homes, migrated. Only these were full members of the religious community; all others remained religious laymen of inferior value: objects, not subjects, of religiosity.")

I really think there's a lot that can be contested in what Weber says here, not least whether his understanding of the ascetic view is truly reflective. Regarding the assertion that the Buddhist monastic "lives in everlasting inconsistency": if considering the Thai Sangha, for example, the negative associations with lay people is not a very accurate depiction except perhaps for a very small minority of dhutanga bhikkhus roaming forests. In practice the relationship between lay and ordained is not one of antipathy, but rather there is a veritable positive eco-system between Sangha and lay supporters - a relationship in which the lay community provides conditions amenable to progress for all, especially monks, yes, but also for each other; and traditionally this includes education and medical help administered by the Sangha to the lay people and encouragement along the Buddhist path.

Furthermore, the lay supporters themselves can share in the practice - they too are expected to cultivate dana, sila and samadhi, albeit less intensively; in the Buddha's time, these were formally upasikas and upasakas, two of the four groups commonly addressed by the Buddha as being his disciples. In Thailand, although most teachers are members of the Sangha, there are some very highly respected lay teachers (and not just the anagarika nuns) - indeed my mother's main meditation teacher, Ajahn Gaew, as a lay person instructed a group of bhikkhus because he was an advanced practitioner. And, I'm quite sure this is not just contemporary, but was true at the time of the Buddha - as argued amply by Jeffrey Samuels, especially concerning attainments along the path to enlightenment, in 'Views of Householders and Lay Disciples in the Sutta Pitaka: A Reconsideration of the Lay/Monastic Opposition', Religion, Volume 29, Issue 3, July 1999, Pages 231-241.

Weber goes on to express more curious views about Buddhism (p.171): "in any case Buddhism enjoined the avoidance of every type of rational, purposive activity, which it regarded as the most dangerous form of secularisation." This needs unpacking as I'm not sure what Weber means, but it sounds mistaken. A monk repairs his kuti in order to help with his practice during the rains retreat. That sounds rational and purposive activity to me!

Conclusion

Overall, I find it encouraging that Weber has tried to understand individual motivations at a deep spiritual level and his work has many interesting ideas flowing from this. However, from what I've read so far, I sense that whilst he has a good command of European history and thought, his analysis of at least Oriental religion contains contains too many misconceptions, which I suspect are based on preconceptions arising out of his own European conditioning. Perhaps further study, under an appropriate guide, will clarify what Weber is trying to say, the main points to be understood, but at the moment it reduces my confidence in the validity of his arguments (and subsequent conclusions).

Weber's Sociology of Religion: An evolutionary approach?

I haven't finished the introduction by Talcott Parsons, but I decide it's time to look at the actual book itself! Once again I'm going to make reference to my knowledge of Buddhism to sharpen the focus.

The preface and introduction are valuable, but it's still a pity there's no foreword from Weber explaining the approaches in chapter 1 onwards - I wonder if there might be a way of including relevant fragments from elsewhere (more possible for online editions). In the translation there's even some difficulty about the chapter title, given here as 'The Rise of Religions,' which according to the review by Reinhard Bendix may be fine as a rendering of 'Die Entstehung der Religionen' but may not be the right one!

Weber's opening remarks in the first chapter state that one can't define or say what religion is until the conclusion of study, "our task ... to study the conditions and effects of a particular type of social behavior." Presumably, one can know what conditions and effects are religious and can identify their characteristics, attributes, etc... , after the event. But is this a bit 'chicken and egg'? What kind of language do we need for the definitions? It makes sense to informally survey the scene to gain some clues as to the kind of theory needed, but how far do you take that? When do you stop? How do sociologists determine when they've reached appropriate milestones and can start codifying?

Parsons hinted at Weber's problem of being "understood" - and from reading his introduction and literature on the Web, it seems he wasn't always successful. That probably reflects the use of natural language. In contrast, a mathematical approach would use a formal notation, have definitions up front and use these in working forward, to derive initially some lemmas and work up to major theorems. Imagine if mathematical theories were subject to such vagaries of uncertainty in translation and interpretation!

The second paragraph indicates the scale of the challenge: "the external courses of religious behavior are so diverse that an understanding of this behavior can only be achieved from the viewpoint of the subject experiences, ideas, and purposes of the individuals concerned - in short, from the viewpoint of the religious behavior's 'meaning' (Sinn)." (Sinn is a German word translated as 'sense' or 'connotation' - for the same reference objects, there may be different connotations.)

The third paragraph talks about "elementary forms of behavior." So the initial perspective appears to concern the origins of religious activity in terms of primitive elements. I guess this is meant to be analogous to the way we can talk in science about atomicity/irreducible elements, simple forms and so on. And of course some branches of science try to make sense of this through theories of evolution, but it's a major/critical step to apply this evolutionary approach to society ...

Accordingly Weber asserts that [in primitive religion] the primary orientation is this world - and the quote from Deuteronomy is intended to illustrate such a "primitive" viewpoint: "That it may go well with thee ... and thou mayest prolong thy days upon the earth." But it is just one quote and even a hundred such quotes can't be proof [by example]! What about other viewpoints, e.g. the pursuit of Heaven? Consider e.g. Job 14:14 - "If a man die, shall he live again? all the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come." (King James Version of the Bible, [see KJV online])

The historical viewpoint is further hinted at with the analogy with making fire, traditionally associated with signs of emerging civilisation in early homo sapiens - it's tempting to map religious development to such evolutionary theories. Compare (and contrast) this with, say, a Buddhist view of humanity's evolution. It's described as a cycle (of Samsara), in which there is both human evolution and devolution with lifespans ranging over many thousands of years (DN. 26 Cakkavatti Sutta - The Wheel-turning Emperor: partly translated into English, with an introduction and also a full translation). However, it's a moral evolution and devolution that the Buddha describes... it is the nobility and virtue of mind that is regarded by the Buddha as a measure of the evolved nature of a human.

Weber states that the "ends are predominantly economic." Is this just reflecting the fact that the approach observes only what is observable...? I wonder to what extent this viewpoint affects the [sociological] analysis of different religious groups today? Is there the assumption that the primary orientation is this world, implying it must be material? What methodologies are used? An appropriate tool might be to carry out surveys of literature and questionnaires of adherents.

Whilst I readily accept that "religious or magical behavior or thinking must not be set apart from the range of everyday purposive conduct," I would query the paragraph's concluding clause: "since even the ends of the religious and magical actions are predominantly economic." If talking about evolution, how about evolution of views within an individual during their life, an evolution that could go from material to transcendental, i.e. [internal, subjective] lower and higher orientations? Given Parson's indication of support for describing changes within spheres, I guess the theoretical framework could support this.

It's tempting to think that current society represents somehow an advance over earlier (and hence primitive) societies. Weber tries to identify early forms of spiritual activity in groups, again leaning on what is observable, and states (p.3): "orgy is the primordial form of religious communication." and goes on to describe how intoxicants induce ecstasy and the aids to reach that transient state: "he may employ any type of alcoholic beverage, tobacco or similar narcotics - and especially music ..." This is a description that could easily apply to many people today who go out for the night, roving pubs and clubs! In fact the run-up fits also: "Because of the routine demands of living, the layman may experience ecstasy only occasionally, as intoxication." This matches the habits of people unfulfilled in their daytime jobs, living only for the weekends and its night-time attractions. But would we call this 'religious behaviour'? I think not - just 'hedonistic behaviour' would be more likely and what can we deduce about evolved humanity then ...?

What about silence as promordial communication? Before the noise there was the silence. Yes? But silence may not be easily registered - it can be only momentary, yet deeply communicative.

Taking things further, what about observations of a monastery where most inhabitants spent most of their time in silent meditation? Most of the 'action' - in terms of experiences of rapture, altered states, jhanic absorptions and so on might be vivid and deeply meaningful, yet have little or no outward manifestation. One might argue that this is not characteristic of primitive religion, yet it is commonly said that children, unencumbered by too much thinking (rationality) can access deep states very quickly and perhaps the same applies to 'simple cultures' in general.

I think this is evidence of the problem of the external descriptive approach.

In theory, sophisticated religion evolves so that magic is left behind. According to Parsons, "In the end, the study of Protestant ethic, according to Weber, merely explored one phase of the emancipation from magic, that disenchantment of the world that he regarded as the distinguishing peculiarity of Western culture." To what extent does that really hold today? Many of the top sports people still exhibit what might be regarded as superstitious behaviour: consider Rafael Nadal's pre-match routine just before play commenced at the classic Wimbledon 2008 final - the cameras showed him sipping out of one water bottle and then the next. More generally, what is/are the attraction(s) of the Harry Potter novels?

Weber then comes to the concept of the soul (which is acknowledged as not being universally accepted) and states: "...what is primarily distinctive in this whole development is not the personality, impersonality or superpersonality of these supernatural powers, but the fact that the new experiences now play a role in life." i.e. A raison d'etre (internalised) in themselves; and the example given is ecstasy. The example of burials is given, useful in showing particularly how the development of belief in the soul changes the associated customs and rituals, which have to accommodate more their needs after death of the physical body, resulting in extra parameters (positioning of body, items placed with the body etc). Of course, a further refinement in belief may remove some of these and not necessarily put anything in their place. There are also other implications we can read into these practices, including some belief in rebirth or reincarnation (or at least some contiguous existence).

Parson's introduction hints at considerable debate around the extent to which Weber's approach was evolutionary and remarks intriguingly that anthropologists were strongly anti-evolutionary. Was that some or most of them? I wonder what their views are today?

That's the last post for today and I still haven't got far into the text - I think before I post again, I need to read a fair bit more.

Weber's Sociology of Religion: Using Differentiation as a Key

Still basing my analysis mainly on Talcott Parson's introduction, I come to Weber's initial topic: primitive religion.

According to Weber, all human society possesses what sociologists would classify as 'religion,' being inter alia "conceptions of a supernatural order, of spirits, gods or impersonal forces which are different from and in some sense superior to those forces conceived as governing ordinary "natural" events...." It's mentioned in particular that work by anthropologists has confirmed that the belief in the supernatural is universal.

Weber is particularly interested in distinguishing between primitive and sophisticated forms. Parsons explains by making the distinction between "natural man," a man belonging to primitive history, and rational man, of more recent times (note the absence of quotes) - it's insisted that for the former "cultural baggage" exists, and only the latter has the level of consciousness to consider dispensing with it. Or is it's removal in practice more of an orphaning of or divorce from practices that contain relevant spiritual meaning?

Continuing the distinction, for Weber breakthroughs [from primitive religion] is an important topic, searching for the directions they take and so on. From what to what? He uses the method of binary differentiation related respectively to and within the spheres 'material'(utilitarian-oriented, associated with daily living) and 'ideal' (to do with meanings and conceptions of the supernatural and the experiential dimension). The binary approach is applied repeatedly to gradually draw out finer distinctions. The outcomes of binary decisions impact change: either evolutionary changes in established order or consolidation of the established order [and institutionalisation]. It's subsequently reiterated that the primary interest for Weber is religion as a source of the dynamics of social change, not stability, and I take it is looking for conditions for processes of change with breakthrough.

A key dichotomy is expressed in terms of the functions of magician vs priest as mediators between humans and the supernatural: the former's ad hoc use of formulas vs the more systematic 'cult' that uses ritual and worshipping agents. Around this is the development of conceptions of the supernatural ... and hence relationships, claims, obligations etc. (using intermediaries). Note that for him the existence of the supernatural doesn't imply transcendental goals, especially not for primitive society.

Their functions are distinguished especially by their handling of another fundamental dichotomoy - between ethics and taboo: priests are concerned more general and universal orientation, and pattern of actions, whereas magicians deal with specific prescription and proscription of actions.

A footnote to this post: the dispensing with cultural baggage has been quite topical in Western Buddhist circles - some want to detach themselves from what they perceive as unnecessary cultural trappings, particularly the rituals, which come from e.g. the Far East - so as to live the 'pure' and 'pristine' teachings of the Lord Buddha. This might in Weber's perspective be a reflection of sophisticated culture - indeed the removal of attachment to rituals would remove one of the lower samyojanas binding to the 'lower shore' of samsara, but that's a really advanced state of practice...

Weber's Sociology of Religion: Setting up the Theory

The introduction to this edition of [Fischoff's translation of] Weber's Sociology of Religion is given by Talcott Parsons, who appears to be a very distinguished American sociologist, the 39th President of the American Sociological Association. It's quite weighty and I'm not sure how much I'll read before I move on, but I'm grateful for any elucidation.

Early on, Parsons states:''his focus was not upon religion "as such," as the theologian or church historian conceives it, but upon the relations between religious ideas and commitments and other aspects of human conduct.'' The foundations were laid in his earlier work 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' (see e.g. the online transcription at the University of Virginia) - the Wikipedia entry describes how it is "an introduction into Weber's later studies of interaction between various religious ideas and economics."  In my first post I had highlighted the element of change and in the subsequent post, I picked up on Fischoff's attention to the processes of association.

Where does it all lead?  That earlier work's conclusion paints an image of how mechanistic working has become. "The Puritan wanted to work in calling; we are forced to do so."  He continues, "For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order." The detachment from the puritan roots, Weber reasoned, was reached post-reformation, without the Church, where most people couldn't determine for themselves a replacement religious authority apart from every day senses of achievement.  In the process of rationalization [Parsons emphasizes the centrality of this conception, pp. xxxii-xxxiii] there would be a tendency based solely on efficiency or calculation and so detachment from the religious roots.  It seems a very bleak picture (at least from a spiritual perspective).

Problems in Concepts and Analysis

After describing some context for Weber's work, Parsons introduces some of the major challenges in developing a systematic approach.  The first problem listed concerns our conceptual frameworks of the cosmos, covering divinity and religious interests. Do these influence mundane activities, e.g. economic action?

A second major problem is an analytical problem: the isolation of variables is sought so as to effectively measure their significance, which requires experimental methods that hold factors constant. It's then asserted that 'degrees of favourableness' of material factors approximate to the varying levels of development of capitalism. If all the materials factors can be held constant, the differing outcomes would point to religion being a significant factor.

So I expect analysis could be carried out between cities in Western Europe and South Asia and South-East Asia, not just overall, but at different levels of material wealth - what account should be taken at the extent of variability? I think it might be instructive to look especially at what happens at different levels of poverty, because it's often observed that, say, people with few possessions in Thailand and other Asian countries are seemingly quite content - since long before major economic development.  Is this contentment with materially little the case in the UK? Probably less so now than before because material expectations are greater nowadays (a facet of consumerism).

There have been many attempts at devising a global 'well-being' index, but different cultures have different values, so it's fraught with difficulty. For example, work on a Personal Wellbeing Index, devised in Australia indicates that objective measures are often idiosyncratic and thence, "With these issues in mind, the Personal Wellbeing Index has been developed to measure the subjective dimension of QOL – Subjective Wellbeing. "

A major issue is the completeness of variables in something so complex as society. It is readily acknowledged that there are many variables that would, for example, have a bearing on economic capitalism - the Wikipedia entry on the 'Protestant Ethic and Spiritual Capitalism' lists some examples: "the rationalism in scientific pursuit, merging observation with mathematics, science of scholarship and jurisprudence, rational systematisation of government administration and economic enterprise." So isn't the method somewhat on shaky ground, because can we ever be sure when we have an exhaustive list?   I reflect that the challenge is to determine meaningful conclusions about causality needs to deal with complexity and yet be sensitive to the tiniest vibration - famously expressed in chaos theory as the butterfly effect - though I actually think causality needs a moral basis - as expressed in the Buddha's teachings on kamma-vipaka.

[Pause for reflection: consider how the Buddha instituted the Sangha, and the economics that flowed associated with that, a veritable ecosystem - here the economics clearly followed from religion.]

Methods

A couple of new terms for me:

(i) Idiographic methods (the book spells 'ideographic' but that seems to have another meaning) -- the study of the individual, which tends to specificity and deals with subjectivity.

(ii) Nomothetic - the study of cohorts - the methods of natural science, which tends to generalisation and deals with observation.

A theory of human behaviour needs principles, definitions of processes, propositions and so on.  As Parsons states: "Causes of human behaviour cannot be found and established without implicit or explicit use of abstract and general concepts and propositions." An illustration or two would have been helpful, but I take it that this will become evident.  He goes on to stress that Weber retains some elements of historicist and idealist traditions, but the shift to general observation evidently carries many risks and I'm not surprised at the remarks by Parsons about the prominence of positivist reductionism with "Behaviorism an extreme manifestation."  There comes to my mind scenes from Douglas Adams' Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy in which the world is a laboratory experiment created by mice ... I think it reflects movement towards a kind of void.

One of the primary issues is a tendency to relativism, a term I've heard a lot with plenty of discussion, views and opinions etc.

Two foci:

1. Interpret action by understanding motices from "subjective" viewpoint [i.e. understanding intentions], put oneself in their shoes; but use patterns of meaning.

   This leads to ideal types, a cornerstone in Weber's system, of which 'Protestant Ethics' and the 'Spirit/Esprit of Capitalism' are two such types.  [Weber defines this there as: "An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. [The methodology of the social sciences (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch, Trans. & Eds.; foreword by Shils). New York: Free Press, 1997 (1903-1917). p.88.] 

   Weber's concept of the "ideal type" was the main path to the formulation of a general theory which incorporated "subjective" factors, the method of Verstehen.  So this is the response to my query in my previous post about the collective orientation.  Will it work sufficiently well...?

   The word "ideal" may seem odd to an English language speaker as it's usual connotation is to do with a goal of perfection, but I've seen it before - ideals are commonly found in algebra, specifically in ring theory.  The algebraic concept looks similar in vein in that it deals with groupings/representations of elements that exhibit properties common among individual numbers.  The algebraic term was apparently coined by Dedekind, a German mathematician, so I guess the word has a subtlety of meaning in German that doesn't get carried over in translation.

2. System of meaning (Sinnzusammenhänge): this links interests (motives) with situations to "understand" peoples' individual actions.

Weber was thus trying to develop a technical framework (German: Handeln) and found that a generalised framework was easier to work with than one treating specifics.

I'll end this post with a couple of questions.

1. To what extent are religious teachings idiographic or nomothetic?  In comparison, the Buddha formulated systematic teachings himself - in his great teachings on Paticcasamuppada (Dependent Origination) [a translation available] is about individual behaviours, but with collective effects.  It might be regarded as the epitome of process-oriented systems of thought! Incidentally, the fact that one may observe a group with same outward properties (e.g. a group receives an apparent windfall) doesn't imply any group actions to earn that windfall - the kamma could have been carried out separately by each individual, but with similar vipaka.]
2. What are the implications of paying attention to external vs internals (of spiritual life)?  I think it leads to diminished significance of the spiritual life (and so works against Weber's wish to adopt the "subjective" point of view).

Weber's Sociology of Religion: Orientation

For my second post on Weber's Sociology of Religion, I now arrive at the translator's preface (I'm not progressing very quickly, am I?!)   I'm interested in viewpoints and see that here the view is on religious phenomena. I have to familiarise myself with the goals, approach, terminology - it's all new to me. Fischoff describes how Weber sought in his 'Religionssoziologie' a very systematic treatment of many topics - so could it be called an early form of 'sociological systems thinking'? The preface helps ease my feeling of disorientation by giving some idea about the context of this book, where it fits into the greater whole: "... in this new edition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, the 'Religionssoziologie' section appears towards the end of the first volumne, in the second part." [p. xii]. 

We are informed that 'Religionssoziologie' is preceded by dealing with types of communital and societal institutions.  So I guess a whole lot of terminology is assumed, and much of the foundation work in terms of approach - important to know as we're informed that Weber tried to be systematic and adopt a scientific approach.  Stepping out and considering the sum of Weber's works, Fischoff describes how the work evolved from 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' plus a number of books describing world religions from a sociological point of view, including 'Indian religion: Hinduism and Buddhism.'  So a proper departure point for the study of Weber is no small task!

Why did Weber feel a need to develop a sociological theory?  Some indications are given, most notably the influence of religion on occidental rationalism, specifically capitalism (economic sphere). Fischoff treats the study of religion and its scholars and remarks that Weber possesses many remarkable qualities, particularly "disinterested and impartial observation."  So the contribution to the field comes from a combination of scientific detachment and sociological perspective to present an analytical treatment of human social activity. It all sounds impressive, but is there such an observer as described?  And does his system actually work?

On the question of methodology, Weber's major concerns appear to include broad learning, methodological refinement, and descriptive analysis. Regarding methodological refinement, I wonder what consideration is there of the validity of the method and checks for this?

Turning back to the content of the theory, the collective, group focus is especially key: indeed the subtitle (introduced on p. xii) is "Typen der religiosen Verge" - "Types of religious association" which could be various kinds of groupings as indicated above, here particularly that one associates with religion - e.g. 'church' and 'prayer group.'

We can probe into the question of what type of associations? Fischoff's explanation reads more into it: "suggests the definition of the situation for Weber as a sociologist, oriented to the social causes and influences as well as the social effects and interrelations of religion upon group life." i.e. how society and religion affect each other at the group level. This is giving more attention to the processes of association.  Further, the association might be (I think is) treated more abstractly, in terms of ideas, as in behaviour A is associated with the religious facet X (or vice versa) ..." [I'm trying to connect with the theory of "ideal types" introduced later on.]

More fundamentally, I wonder about the focus on group vs individual. When  considering the processes of association there's a familiar sense and meaning about people associating with other people.  In Buddhism the Maha Mangala Sutta is well known and has important advice about associations - the first blessing is "not to associate with fools!" and the second one is "to associate with the wise." However, this is an exhortation primarily aimed at the individual. Furthermore, associations are discussed in great detail in the Sigalovada Sutta, but again this is focused on the individual.  Of course, there may be groups of individuals behaving the same way, but that's not always the case, and the behaviours of groups with strong individual behaviours may not be explicable in terms of group modalities. Yes? No? What is lost through analysis at the group level?

Actually, I wonder more generally - beyond the context of associations - about the generation of a social theory that gathers itself primarily around the collective viewpoint.  Why not start at the individual and expand out?  For the Buddha taught: "in this fathom long body is the origin of the world, its cessation and the path leading to cessation." [Rohitassa Sutta, Anguttara Nikaya 4:45].  Viewpoints are so fundamental.  Perhaps I'm mistaken with the impression that this work is primarily built on a collective perspective or perhaps I'm missing some other point - I should read on!

Max Weber: The Sociology of Religion - My first sip

Having re-acquainted myself with the routines of a student during the recent Pali Summer School, albeit only for 12 days, I'm now delving into some of the reading material that I shall need to embrace in my forthcoming studies.

A couple of weeks ago, whilst ambling towards Oxford's city centre, I popped into a charity bookshop and spotted one of the items on the reading list, as given in last year's degree pamphlet. It's 'The Sociology of Religion' by Max Weber, translated from the German into English by Ephraim Fischoff with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, this edition published in 1966 in a 'Social Science Paperbacks' series in assocation with Methuen & Co. (nearest match I can find has different publisher but probably the same text).

I have not studied any sociology, at least not formally, and I can't recall ever having considered studying it in the past. It was not a subject that was taught at my secondary school and the subjects I chose to pursue at University over a period of about 8 years were mathematics and computer science. Sociology has seemed a world away from all this and although I worked previously at Derby University, where there was significant work in this field, my focus was on the I.T., multifaith activities and fundraising!

Now it's time to take a much closer look...  At this stage, before I attend any formal lectures or receive tutorials, I intend to examine some of the literature and jot down ideas, responses and particularly to try to go engage with the texts by questioning what comes my way, trying to make sense of it by comparing and contrasting with what knowledge I have in other fields.  I'll do this piecemeal in a number of posts - comments that may help me properly understand what this is all about are welcome!

Picking up the book, I notice it's a fair thickness, but not huge, though it does include two prefaces that combined amount to around 60 pages! Not having any knowledge, I expect these to shed light and indeed as I come to learn that this work is a fragment of a greater whole, it seems that I really will need a guide to the work.   So let's start then with the context, which is very broad - Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - a huge opus in German, translated as 'Economy and Society' of which 'Religionssoziologie' (The Sociology of Religion) is one portion. Alas I can't read or write German, so I'm dependent on translation and am well aware that nuances can get lost and extra bits can get added in. Indeed, a review by Reinhard Bendix [Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring, 1964), pp. 268-270], indicates particularly how some extra meaning has crept in. However, overall, as that review suggests, I think these will be minor and the translation will be generally fine.

Turning the front cover of the book reveals a short 100-150 word abstract which mentions "the casual role of religion in social change." What is meant by "casual"? Nowadays it tends to mean informal (as in 'casual dress') or only temporary, not permanent, as in 'casual worker,' but I assume here that it is more along the lines of 'what happens [to be the case]', from the Latin casus, meaning 'having fallen,' which could be in the sense "this year Christmas Day falls on a Sunday."). So I guess a 'casual' role might be how religious occurrences and phenomena can be observed as affecting social change. It has an accidental, chance ring about it, something that's a byproduct, 'by the way.'

The change element appears key - the preface and introduction talk a lot about social action and the dynamics of change. We are informed that the focus is not on religion per se but its effects. Thus, it is establishing a basis for looking at how religions impact [in a major way] society and I see it would naturally lend itself to analysis of reform movements, engagement etc, rather than focusing on the static and conservative aspects.

It's probably worth spending some time looking at this deliberate decision and considering its implications. Analogous decisions are made in other disciplines - there's a weighing up of two analytical approaches oriented on what I call 'structure vs. flow' - crudely speaking what it is and what it does respectively. In my computer science research in formal methods, I learnt quite early on that a standard division is made between axiomatic techniques and process algebras. The kind of language you choose depends upon what you are seeking to model. Axiomatic techniques traditionally excel in data-rich applications, whereas process algebras suit modelling action-based behaviours, commonly used in safety-critical applications where you want to prove such a sequence of actions will/won't happen etc. In practice, elements of each are present implicitly or explicitly in a given language, but sometimes both are needed to completely model and analyse a system.

So let's have a pause there.  :-)